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SUMMARY
If Canada’s interest in the North American Free Trade Agreement was in deepening regional trade integration 
between our economy and the U.S. and Mexico, then we could say it certainly succeeded — at least for about 
five years. 
By 1999, however, Canada’s NAFTA trade had peaked, and it has since only declined as a share of its trade 
with the rest of the world: from 79 to 66 per cent. Truly free trade with the U.S. has proved elusive — the 
number of professions granted labour-mobility concessions under NAFTA has gone virtually unchanged for 
20 years — and trade irritants continue to rankle on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border (think: country-of-
origin labelling and “Buy America” rules). That has left Canada looking to strike more free-trade deals in new, 
farther-flung markets, as a way of diversifying its export markets. 
In the meantime, the low-cost labour advantages that Mexico 20 years ago offered its NAFTA partners were 
soon eroded by Asian emerging-market competitors, particularly China. But while Canada was scouring the 
globe for promising new bilateral trade partnerships, we overlooked the transformation happening on our 
doorstep in Mexico: it has become an especially promising emerging market itself. It has a growing consumer 
base, with its middle class alone exceeding the entire population of Canada. The number of Mexican students 
in higher education has tripled over the last three decades. Its recent economic growth rates have been 1.5 
to two times higher than that of either Canada or the U.S. and its GDP is projected to quadruple by 2050, 
making it one of the world’s five-largest economies. 
Mexico has also become an enthusiastic trader, eagerly pursuing new global trade opportunities while 
persistently calling for the expansion of North American trade linkages, including direct bilateral deals with 
Canada. Meanwhile, global value chains are increasingly regional in nature, suggesting there exists a great 
deal of potential in a deeper relationship between Canada and Mexico, rather than each country largely 
relating to one another through their mutual relationship with the United States. 
There are a number of barriers in the way of course. Canada is displeased with Mexico’s impediments to 
Canadian beef imports, and Mexicans remain aggravated over Canada’s heightened visa restrictions. The 
relationship is tepid and its future uncertain. But the two countries do have a head start in pursuing deeper 
integration, thanks to the common trade rules and dispute-settlement procedures already established 
through their partnership in NAFTA, and a closer relationship with one another would help both countries 
form an effective counterbalance against the U.S. on matters of joint interest. 
A medium-sized economy like Canada cannot be competitive everywhere. Our greatest advantage lies at 
home, in North America, where we can advance our role in the regional supply chain. Putting our greatest 
focus on North America means intensifying our trading relationship with Mexico. Fortunately for us, it 
happens to be one of the most promising emerging markets in the world.
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SOMMAIRE
Si l’intérêt du Canada dans le cadre de l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALENA) était de consolider 
l’intégration commerciale régionale entre notre économie et celles des États-Unis et du Mexique, on pourrait dire que 
cette entente a été couronnée de succès, du moins pendant environ cinq ans.
Dès 1999, toutefois, le commerce canadien dans le cadre de l’ALENA avait atteint un sommet et, depuis lors, il n’a fait 
que décliner en tant que pourcentage de ses échanges avec le reste du  monde, de 79 à 66 pour cent. L’établissement 
d’un véritable libre-échange avec les É.-U. s’est avéré difficile à réaliser. Le nombre de professions bénéficiant de 
concessions en matière de mobilité de la main-d’œuvre en vertu de l’ALENA est demeuré pratiquement inchangé 
depuis 20 ans et les différends commerciaux continuent à être une source de mécontentement des deux côtés de 
la frontière canado-américaine (il suffit de penser au marquage du pays d’origine et aux règles privilégiant l’achat 
de biens américains). Cela a poussé le Canada à rechercher la conclusion d’autres accords de libre-échange dans de 
nouveaux marchés, plus éloignés, comme moyen de diversifier ses marchés d’exportation.
Entretemps, les avantages d’une main-d’œuvre à faible coût que le Mexique offrait il y a 20 ans à ses partenaires de 
l’ALENA ont rapidement été érodés par des compétiteurs de marchés asiatiques émergents, la Chine en particulier. 
Pendant que le Canada fouillait la planète à la recherche de nouveaux partenariats commerciaux bilatéraux prometteurs, 
nous avons négligé la transformation qui se produisait à nos portes, au Mexique, pays qui est lui-même devenu un 
marché émergent particulièrement prometteur. Son bassin de consommateurs est en pleine croissance, sa classe 
moyenne dépassant à elle seule l’ensemble de la population canadienne. Le nombre d’étudiants mexicains poursuivant 
des études supérieures a triplé au cours des trois dernières décennies. Son taux de croissance économique récent a 
été de 1,5 à 2 fois supérieur à celui du Canada et des É.-U. et l’on prévoit que son PIB va quadrupler d’ici 2050, plaçant 
son économie parmi les cinq plus importantes au monde.
Le Mexique s’est également lancé avec enthousiasme dans le commerce, recherchant avidement les occasions 
d’échanges internationaux tout en demandant avec insistance l’expansion des liens commerciaux nord-américains, 
y compris des accords bilatéraux directs avec le Canada. Pendant ce temps, les chaînes de valeur mondiales sont de 
nature de plus en plus régionale, ce qui suggère qu’il existe un important potentiel pour approfondir la relation entre 
le Canada et le Mexique, plutôt que de laisser les relations entre ces deux pays dépendre de celle que chacun d’eux 
entretient avec les États-Unis.
Il existe, bien entendu, un certain nombre d’obstacles. Le Canada est mécontent des entraves imposées par le Mexique 
aux importations de bœuf canadien et les Mexicains sont exaspérés par les restrictions plus sévères en matière de visas 
imposées par le Canada. La relation est tiède et son avenir incertain. Les deux pays sont toutefois sur la bonne voie 
pour parvenir à une intensification de l’intégration grâce à des règles commerciales et à des procédures de règlement 
des différends communes déjà établies par l’intermédiaire de leur partenariat dans l’ALENA. Une relation plus étroite 
entre eux aiderait les deux pays à faire contrepoids efficacement aux États-Unis sur des questions d’intérêt commun.
Une économie de taille moyenne comme celle du Canada ne peut être concurrentielle partout. Notre avantage le 
plus important, on le retrouve ici, en Amérique du Nord, où nous pouvons faire progresser notre rôle dans la chaîne 
d’approvisionnement régionale. La priorisation de l’Amérique du Nord signifie l’intensification de notre relation 
commerciale avec le Mexique. Heureusement pour nous, il se trouve qu’il s’agit là de l’un des marchés émergents les 
plus prometteurs au monde.
1INTRODUCTION
With the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada and Mexico entered a trade 
relationship for which there was little commercial rationale at the time because the two countries had 
few direct trade linkages or interests. But, ready or not, NAFTA provided key mechanisms to bring the 
two economies together. The two now share common trade rules, dispute-settlement procedures, and 
integrated supply chains. Twenty years after the start of this uncertain courtship, the NAFTA framework 
not only provides the foundation for North American competitiveness, it provides Canada with a fast-
growing emerging-market partner with a large consumer class and affordable labour, and provides 
Mexico with a source of innovation and investment. 
Why haven’t Canada and Mexico focused more on their two-way trade, apart from their trade with the 
United States? Perhaps both parties have become accustomed to the mutual relationship playing second 
fiddle to the opportunities and irritants of their larger relationship with the U.S. And, while Mexico 
continues to reach out to Canada, the Canadian government seems to prefer the novelty of farther fields 
in its emerging-market prospects, overlooking the thriving Mexican market, with whom it already shares 
an integrated trade-regulatory regime. 
The economic complementarity between Canada and Mexico was not particularly strong when NAFTA 
was signed in 1994, but both economies have changed and evolved over the ensuing decades. Mexico 
has become the kind of export and production partner that Canada needs. It has a large, youthful market 
to complement Canada’s relatively small and aging market. Mexico’s pool of affordable skilled labour 
is ideally suited to help Canadian manufacturers deal with the conundrum of high domestic innovative 
capacity constrained by high domestic labour costs. Canada and Mexico are not merely spokes in a U.S. 
production hub; they have developed mutual synergies that are woefully underdeveloped. 
The NAFTA relationship is a foundation for North American competitiveness in the world. By 
neglecting or mismanaging it, we are hurting our own prospects for future economic sustainability. This 
report discusses the evolution of Canada-Mexico economic engagement; opportunities and challenges 
within the North American regional value chain; and provides recommendations for maximizing the 
benefits of the relationship.
RELUCTANT SUITORS
In the early days of NAFTA, there were few natural trade complementarities between Mexico and 
Canada. Mexico was an exporter of raw commodities and a producer of petroleum products; Canada had 
a similar commodities endowment but also had manufactured goods and services to sell. High levels of 
Canadian exports to Mexico were unlikely because, in the early 1990s, Mexico’s economy was volatile, 
burdened by macroeconomic instability and a weak consumer base. Canada-Mexico trade has also been 
hindered by differing languages and cultural backgrounds, a small intercultural diaspora, and the fact 
that the U.S. market is much larger, closer and easier to access for both countries.1
Fast-forward 20 years and a lot has changed. The NAFTA-led reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers 
provided Canada and Mexico with significant trade gains in the United States. The WTO Uruguay 
Round, completed in 1994, brought a number of new emerging markets into the international trading 
1 Canada insisted on being added to the U.S. bilateral agreement with Mexico out of concerns that its preferences in the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1989) would be eroded through the new agreement. See Laura Dawson, Christopher 
Sands and Duncan Woods, North American Competitiveness: The San Diego Agenda (Dawson Strategic, Hudson Institute, 
Institute of the Americas and Mexico Institute, November 2013). Mexico probably would have preferred to maintain a 
bilateral negotiation, but it wanted a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. and was willing to accept the request to add 
Canada to facilitate completion of the negotiation.
2system and pushed established, industrialized economies to reduce their tariffs even further to maintain 
cost competitiveness.
China’s 2001 entry to the WTO was a major disruption to North America’s trade-integration trajectory. 
While trade among the NAFTA partners has continued to grow, new trade growth peaked in 1999 and 
has declined since then. Table 1 shows how Canada’s NAFTA trade has not kept pace with its trade with 
the rest of the world.
TABLE 1
Year Canada Trade with World Total NAFTA Trade as % of 
Total World TradeExports Imports Total Trade
1994 165,220 148,425 313,644 76
1995 191,062 164,315 355,377 75
1996 202,286 170,564 372,849 76
1997 215,296 197,149 412,445 76
1998 214,707 201,202 415,909 78
1999 239,198 215,635 454,833 79
2000 278,218 240,363 518,581 78
2001 260,959 221,581 482,539 78
2002 252,416 222,216 474,632 78
2003 271,966 239,837 511,803 76
2004 316,762 273,427 590,190 75
2005 360,164 314,360 674,524 73
2006 388,314 350,113 738,427 71
2007 418,978 378,953 797,931 70
2008 453,560 407,135 860,695 68
2009 315,036 319,945 634,981 66
2010 387,290 391,994 779,284 66
2011 452,424 451,353 903,777 65
2012 454,643 462,257 916,900 66
Source: Statistics Canada, U.S. Census Bureau, and Mexico Ministry of Economy. 
Units: Value in millions of U.S. dollars.
After just five years, the NAFTA honeymoon was over. The lower-cost labour advantages offered by 
other emerging-market competitors — particularly China, but also South Korea, Vietnam and other 
participants in Asian supply chains — eroded Mexico’s labour-cost advantages and virtually eliminated 
low-wage assembly jobs in Canada and the United States. New emerging-market competitors caused 
investment and production to flow from North America to Asia, marking a fundamental change from 
national to global production chains.
The NAFTA advantages were not totally eliminated by Chinese competition because labour costs are 
not the only factor informing business investment decisions. As General Electric vice-president Karan 
Bhatia notes, multinationals also consider productivity, access to markets and human resources when 
deciding where to invest.2 Also, for those companies that already had sunk costs in North American 
supply chains, it was not feasible to relocate again to China. Fortunately, after the first wave of 
offshoring to Asia was complete, many Canadian business owners realized that North American supply 
chains offered superior benefits. 
2 World Economic Forum, The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing Countries and 
Trade Policy (2012), 7.
3Among Mexico’s advantages are: cheaper and faster shipping to customers in the U.S. and Canada;3 
a skilled (and rapidly skilling) workforce; and a good (and improving) logistics network to ensure a 
reliable source of supply. The CEO of Canada’s Palliser Furniture notes, for example, that if a machine 
breaks down at his Winnipeg plant, his Mexican team can seamlessly manufacture and ship product to 
a customer with no deviations in price, time or quality.4 Even on labour costs, Mexico has managed to 
remain competitive, since wage rates in Mexico have not been rising as quickly as China’s have.5 
As the global economy has changed, so too have the NAFTA economies. Canada’s most successful 
manufacturers have kept knowledge- and capital-intensive activities at home, but have had to offshore 
basic assembly jobs to lower-cost locations. As global competition increases, Canada’s success relies on 
staying at the front end of the innovation cycle, finding ways to commercialize and market technology, 
maintaining a highly skilled workforce, and reducing unnecessary transaction costs such as border 
barriers and regulatory red tape. 
The United States, while still the largest economy in the world, is shrinking in terms of relative market 
power, demand, and productive capacity. Within NAFTA, U.S. firms are increasingly supply-chain 
partners with, not competitors to, companies in Canada and Mexico. The uncertainty over who is a 
partner and who is a competitor has created a policy ambivalence in the U.S. It is no longer a simple 
matter for Congress to protect domestic jobs by closing markets, when U.S. exporters are demanding 
that legislators open new global markets and foster integrated supply chains.
The promise of NAFTA was to create a single, borderless market for the movement of goods, services, 
investment, people and ideas. While the reality has fallen far short of the promise, government policies 
based on blunt mercantilism that do not acknowledge the realities of cross-border supply chains are no 
longer satisfactory to either producers or consumers. 
The transition from national to transnational production has been particularly difficult for U.S. trade 
policy-makers. Since the mid-1990s, policy has tended to make wide swings between market-seeking 
and market-closing behaviour, with neither direction fully dominant. These divisions are exacerbated by 
a highly polarized and non-productive Congress, meaning that the U.S. can do very little that requires 
legislative action. This also helps explain why U.S. political leadership on North American integration 
has been absent during the Obama presidency and why the U.S., as the leading protagonist of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, has struggled to get Trade Promotion Authority from Congress. It also helps to 
explain the contradiction between U.S. statements about the need to upgrade NAFTA within new trade 
arrangements with Asia and the European Union, but the lack of any formal consultative mechanisms 
through which to operationalize this co-operation within current trade negotiations.6
MEXICO COMES INTO ITS OWN
Mexico meanwhile, has been actively pursing an outward-oriented economic policy and today has 12 
free-trade agreements involving 44 countries on three different continents, providing preferential access 
to a potential market of more than 1 billion consumers and investors.7 Mexico (together with Canada) 
3 
A container leaving Shanghai takes around 31 days to reach New Jersey; a similar container from Veracruz takes five days.
4 
Comments from Art deFehr, CEO of Palliser Furniture (December 2013).
5 “Mexico hourly wages now lower than China’s – study,” Reuters, April 4, 2013.
6 U.S. Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker has frequently called NAFTA outdated and in need of reform. See United States, 
Department of State/IIP Digital website, “Commerce Secretary Pritzker on U.S.-Mexican Economic Relations,” statement 
(February 2014).
7 Canada currently has free-trade agreements in force with 15 countries. Its recently completed agreements with the EU and 
South Korea bring this number up to 44, but the latter agreements may not take effect for months or years.
4entered the TPP negotiations in 2012 and its FTA with the European Union took effect in 2000. In June 
2013, Mexico signed the so-called Tequila Agreement aimed at increasing Mexico’s exports to China 
and reducing its trade deficit with that country.8 
Since 1994, Mexico has engaged in an ambitious campaign of economic and governance reforms. While 
there is still room for improvement, adherence to the rule of law, transparent dispute settlement and 
commercial law practices that are broadly similar to Canada’s, make Mexico a much easier market for 
Canadian businesses than other developing countries in Asia, Africa or Eastern Europe.
Of particular interest to Canada is Mexico’s leadership in the Pacific Alliance. The alliance is a 
progressive group of like-minded Latin American traders — including Mexico, Colombia, Peru and 
Chile — that goes beyond traditional trade agreements to include advantageous provisions on rules of 
origin, labour mobility, regulatory alignment and even a common stock exchange. While Canada has not 
joined the Pacific Alliance negotiations, it has become an interested observer with the June 2014 meeting 
attended by Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird.
Mexico’s aggressive external-trade and domestic-reform campaign is dispelling any notions of that 
country as a junior partner in need of bolstering from more advanced economies. Mexico has doggedly 
pursued new global trade opportunities while continuing to call for the expansion of North American 
trade linkages by any means possible, including direct bilateral deals with Canada.9
Among Mexico’s strengths are a growing consumer base and an increasingly educated workforce. 
Goldman Sachs predicts that by 2050, Mexico will be one of the world’s five largest economies and its 
GDP will quadruple to $9.3 trillion.10 Recent growth rates11 have been 1.5 to two times higher than those 
of the United States or Canada. In February 2014, Moody’s elevated Mexico’s credit rating, making it the 
second Latin American economy after Chile to achieve an A-grade rating.
With a total population of 122 million, not only is the Mexican market more than three times the size 
of Canada’s, Mexico’s middle class alone exceeds the entire population of Canada.12 Mexico also boasts 
substantial increases in GDP per capita and has seen a tripling of the number of Mexican students in 
higher education over the last three decades.13
Mexico still has many challenges, however. Topping the list is crime, which serves as both a real and 
psychological barrier to potential investors. While big companies are better able to insulate themselves 
from security challenges than are smaller ones, a Financial Times editorial speculated that insecurity 
has become the number one deterrent to all sorts of investors because of perceptions that weak rule of 
law in the criminal sphere will also affect economic activities.14
In 2006, Mexico’s then president Felipe Calderón launched a crackdown on Mexico’s extensive narco-
trafficking networks. While successful in breaking up large cartels, these efforts also succeeded in 
8 Neither Canada nor the United States have a bilateral free-trade agreement with China.
9 Mexican Ambassador to Canada Francisco Suarez Davila, is a forceful advocate for closer Canada-Mexico relations. See 
Campbell Clark, “Mexico pushes for direct ties with Canada, apart from U.S. influence,” The Globe and Mail, June 17, 
2013.
10 Goldman Sachs Global Economics, The BRICs 10 Years On: Halfway Through the Great Transformation (December 2011).
11 Mexico’s real GDP growth rates were 3.6 per cent for 2012, 1.2 per cent (est.) for 2013, and 3.4 per cent (est.) for 2014. 
Source: CIA World Factbook and Banco de México.
12 The Migration Policy Institute estimates that Mexico’s middle class is between 30 and 60 per cent of the population, or 37 
to 74 million people. Migration Policy Institute and Woodrow Wilson Center, “Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: 
Leveraging Migration & Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico and South America” (May 2013). 
13 ibid.
14 Financial Times, “Mexico is struggling in battle for rule of law: The country needs security and order as much as economic 
reform,” October 2014.
5splintering large, professionalized networks into decentralized local gangs engaged in violent turf wars 
and extortion, often under the protection of local police forces. The 2014 kidnapping and murder of 43 
students ignited social unrest and threatens to destabilize the government. In response, current President 
Enrique Peña Nieto has committed to imposing state and federal control over those police forces with 
corrupt or criminal ties, and establishing special economic zones in the poorest regions15 where crime 
rates are also the highest.16 
Although Mexico’s economic growth over the past two decades has been impressive, it has not been 
enough to make the leap from a developing economy to developed one. It continues in a state of semi-
dependence, unable to attract sufficient (or the right kind of) investment to add more domestic value 
added to the production cycle.17 As the Mexican business press observed, “Mexico is a country that 
re-exports what it imports but produces very little on its own.”18 Through economic and fiscal reforms 
undertaken by the Peña Nieto administration, Mexico is focused on renewing its industry to become 
more export competitive. In the meantime however, Mexico is challenged with creating enough jobs to 
keep up with population growth. (The gap between job creation and population growth explains why 
Mexico’s wage growth rates are relatively flatter than China’s.) 
Analysis by the Mexico Institute suggests there is a weak structure in place linking the country’s public 
policies, education system, and private sector. “Even with its most skilled labor force ever, Mexico is 
experiencing limited job creation and low labor force productivity.”19 Lack of funding for innovation 
through government and private-sector investment had dampened Mexican productivity and eroded 
international competiveness, especially in relation to China, which has boosted its investment in science 
and technology. In its outreach to potential foreign investors, Mexico has therefore put increasing focus 
on R&D, training and innovation partnerships. The efforts of Bombardier and Mexican officials to create 
an aerospace-training network that includes Montreal and Querétaro is cited as a model project to be 
emulated in other sectors. 
STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Even though NAFTA’S economic integration project included partners that were either mismatched or 
simply reluctant, Canada and Mexico now have an advantage that few global trading partners enjoy. 
While most free-trade agreements in force today have been signed within the last decade, the NAFTA 
partners have more than two decades of experience with transparent trade rules and mechanisms for 
dispute settlement, leading to the growth of strong trilateral supply chains in such sectors as automotive, 
aerospace and agrifoods.20 
But despite strong prospects and isolated success stories, the current state of the Canada-Mexico 
relationship is tepid and future growth is uncertain. One reason for this is asymmetrical investment 
flows. Business and supply-chain integration depends on robust two-way investment. While some 
Canadian businesses such as Scotiabank (finance), Bombardier (aerospace and rail), Linamar (auto 
parts), and Newgold (mining) have done very well in Mexico, the same cannot be said for Mexican 
investment in Canada. Mexican outbound investment has been increasing in other parts of the world, 
15 
Guerrero, Oaxáca and Chiapas.
16 
Claudio Herrera-Pahl, “For a Powerful Mexico Without Organized Crime,” Deutsche-Welle, November 2014.
17 Jorge Castañeda, “The View From Mexico,” Foreign Affairs, January 2014.
18 Comercio Exterior y Logística, “Del TLCAN al TPP” (March 2014). 
19 
Duncan Wood, Christopher Wilson and Alejandro Garcia, “Fostering Innovation in Mexico: Ideas from the High-Level 
Innovation Forum for Policymakers” (Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center, September 2014).
20 
Of the more than 240 regional free-trade agreements notified to the WTO, only about 40 of them predate NAFTA.
6but Canada has done a poor job in attracting it. In 2012, Mexico had outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows of more than $26 billion, acquiring companies in the United States, the European Union, 
and Latin America. The 2014 acquisition of Canada Bread by Grupo Bimbo may signal a change from 
the predominantly one-way investment flows. 
Secondly, most aspects of the Canada-Mexico economic relationship are mediated by the United 
States, and Canadian officials have shown a marked preference for dealing with the U.S. directly on 
trade matters rather than through a trilateral framework. Consequently, both Canada and Mexico have 
established bilateral dialogues with the United States on regulatory co-operation, energy and border 
measures, but Mexico and Canada do not have a formal mechanism for communicating with each other 
on these issues. 
Finally, certain irritants between the two countries have gone unresolved and are undermining the 
relationship. For Canada, an outstanding concern has been the restoration of market access for Canadian 
beef following the BSE scare of 2003.21 For Mexico’s part, the continuation of a supposedly temporary 
visa requirement by Canada on Mexican nationals is considered by Mexican business and government 
leaders to be intrusive and insulting.22 Canada has been paying the price in terms of sharply reduced 
tourist flows and untold losses in goodwill and potential business investment. Rumours of a streamlined 
entry system modelled on the U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization have not been confirmed.
Is this relationship worth the effort? The following section discusses how regional value chains are 
the key to competitiveness in the global economy and the ways in which Mexico and Canada are 
interdependent partners and allies within the North American value chain.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL VALUE CHAINS
The term global value chain (GVC) describes the disaggregation of sourcing, production, and 
distribution across multiple sites within and across national borders. GVCs rose to prominence in the 
1980s as technological advances made it easier to move goods, capital and digital services across long 
distances. These advances also made it easier for global producers to source lower-cost labour and other 
resources from developing countries 
In order to take advantage of value-chain efficiencies, companies set up plants or affiliates in new 
markets, what Markuson calls vertical investment.23 These investment decisions are based on complex 
sourcing and integration strategies that evaluate trade costs and comparative advantages across the 
stages of production.24 Intermediate goods cross and re-cross national borders many times on the road to 
becoming a finished good. 
The foreign-content share in global exports has almost doubled since 1970.25 Thus, the 
internationalization of production blurs the line between domestic and international policies and 
overturns the distinctions between allies and competitors. For instance, Mexican exports to the U.S. 
21 Two-way beef trade has opened up considerably in 2014 as a result of co-operation between Mexican and Canadian food 
safety authorities to achieve mutual recognition of standards and inspections. 
22 CBC news, “Mexico ‘really mad’ at Canada for imposing travel visas,” September 2013.
23 James R. Markusen, “Multinationals, Multi-Plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade,” Journal of International 
Economics 16, 3-4 (1984).
24 International Monetary Fund, Trade Interconnectedness: The World With Global Value Chains (August 2013), 30.
25 ibid., 3.
7include an average of 40 per cent U.S. content, and Canadian exports to the U.S. contain an average of 
25 per cent U.S. content.26 
Integration is not limited to manufacturing and commodities. Services are also key to global value 
chains. For example, more than 30 per cent of the value of a finished automobile comes from services.27 
Canada has room for growth in services exports. While 70 per cent of domestic GDP is derived from 
services, only about 15 per cent of Canadian exports are service exports.28
The benefits of vertical integration are now being realized. Higher national growth rates are associated 
with more intensive participation in global value chains.29 The greatest growth benefits go to those 
economies and enterprises with the highest levels of value added in their exports as well as their 
imports.30 
Growth has been particularly strong in emerging markets that rely heavily on advanced economies 
for sophisticated intermediate inputs required for final products to export.31 Cross-border production 
stimulates technical improvement and knowledge spillovers, encourages competition, and leads firms 
toward more productive activities.32
But, there is a downside. The interdependence created by value-chain participation also increases 
vulnerability to political and economic shocks transmitted across national borders, particularly supply-
and-demand disruptions.33 Therefore, policy co-ordination is necessary in order to minimize external 
shocks.
REGIONAL VALUE CHAINS
True global value chains are, in fact, quite rare and limited to some of the world’s largest corporations 
such as General Electric and Nestlé. Regional value chains are more common because the production 
cycle is very sensitive to distance — fuel costs, shipping time, etc. — especially when moving 
intermediate goods through a geographically disaggregated production cycle.34
Canadian auto parts companies working in Mexico report that manufacturers want their suppliers within 
100 miles of assembly operations.35 Efficient value chains require face-to-face interaction, dependable 
sources of supply, and easy movement of capital, goods and people.
Today, global production is centered in Asia, North America and Europe, and each regional “factory” 
is directed by a “hub.” Control of technology and markets influences a region’s benefits and determines 
its position as a hub or spoke. Hub economies, such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany, orchestrate the 
26 Christopher Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico, Mexico Institute, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2011. 
27 World Economic Forum, The Shifting, 18.
28 DFATD, Canada’s State of Trade and Investment 2014.
29 
Gianluca Orefice and Nadia Rocha, “Deep Integration and Production Networks: an Empirical Analysis,” World Trade 
Organization Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-11 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2011).
30 International Monetary Fund, Trade Interconnectedness, 11-12.
31 ibid., 3.
32 ibid., 11.
33 ibid., 3.
34 
Richard Baldwin, “WTO 2.0: Global Governance of Supply Chain Trade,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy 
Insight No. 64 (December 2012), 5.
35 Author’s interviews, December 2013.
8production networks, while spoke economies such as Canada and Mexico compete to attract offshored 
jobs and investment.36 
There are large flows of goods and services between the hub and the spokes, but flows between the 
spokes are small. This therefore contributes to the misperception that Canada and Mexico are not 
important to each other’s trade prospects. Even though direct trade flows between the two are small, the 
regional (NAFTA) supply chains are critically important, even if the trade is mediated by the U.S. hub.
Canada operates as a spoke in the NAFTA supply chain, but it is a spoke that provides both primary 
commodities, such as petroleum, minerals and grain, as well as capital-intensive activities requiring 
higher skills or technology. For its part, Mexico provides labour-intensive inputs, but it also has a large 
domestic market, and preferential access to some markets that Canada and the United States do not have. 
In order to prosper and grow, Canada does not have to control all nodes of the value chain, but it must 
have preferential access to all of them. Mexico and Canada thus have high levels of complementarity 
in terms of their capacities and future prospects. Interviews with Canadian and Mexican businesses 
reveal many examples of virtuous circles where, for instance, Canada provides the designs, Mexico 
provides the assembly, and later, Mexico also introduces innovations to the production process that are 
subsequently adopted in both Canada and Mexico.37
VALUE-CHAIN GOVERNANCE AND POLICY
The proliferation of free-trade agreements in the 1990s and 2000s cut many of the costs of cross-border 
production by lowering tariffs, but these early agreements did little to reduce non-tariff or “behind-the-
border” barriers such as regulatory differences, and transportation and logistics bottlenecks. 
Regional and multilateral free-trade agreements helped to reduce the cost of importing inputs from, and 
selling products to other countries. But, as competition among regions increases, progressively greater 
efficiencies are required. The success of a regional value chain depends on its ability to maximize the 
complementary endowments of all members while minimizing costs associated with the cross-border 
movement of goods, services, knowledge and people.38
The need for deeper integration and co-ordinated behind-the-border policies has been a major challenge 
in North America because of NAFTA’s weak trinational governance and renewal arrangements. 
Unlike the European Union, North America lacks a strong supranational governance mechanism and 
improvements to NAFTA have tended to be marginal and under the radar.39 Of the many NAFTA 
working groups formed to monitor implementation of the agreement, only highly technical groups 
covering such subjects as rules of origin and pesticide limits have managed to fulfill their original 
mandate. By contrast, the list of professions granted labour-mobility concessions under NAFTA has 
gone virtually unchanged for 20 years. 
The prospect of formally re-opening NAFTA sends U.S. politicians running for cover. Canadian trade 
officials meanwhile have adopted a “NAFTA if necessary, but not necessarily NAFTA” approach as 
they struggle to maintain privileged access to U.S. markets while managing complex negotiations in the 
36 
Baldwin, “WTO 2.0,” 5.
37 See case studies in Laura Dawson, Canada’s Trade With Mexico: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going and Why It 
Matters (Canadian Council of Chief Executives, February 2014).
38 International Monetary Fund, Trade Interconnectedness, 27.
39 
Rules of origin, for example, have been successfully updated through a relatively straightforward notification system, 
but few of the NAFTA working groups established to support and expand the relationship, such as the working group on 
temporary entry (labour mobility), now have any substantive contact.
9European Union, Asia Pacific, India, Japan, South Korea and the Caribbean, as well as various WTO 
commitments.
Baldwin40 argues that traditional trade rules were designed with the goal of helping exporters sell 
finished products in other countries. To support this, the early days of GATT and WTO negotiations 
were focused on tariff reduction. Today, with average trade-weighted tariffs at low levels among 
industrialized states (see Figure 1), the focus for NAFTA trade policy is on behind-the-border measures 
such as reducing the administrative burden of rules of origin.41 
Reduction of non-tariff barriers becomes even more important as more small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) enter the trading system. Large companies can afford workarounds for inefficient 
and duplicative policies — some may even benefit from competitive advantages of operating in markets 
that are too expensive for other firms — but SMEs require a supportive and transparent regulatory 
environment to operate successfully in multiple jurisdictions. Since proximity means that NAFTA 
partners are each other’s most likely first trading partners for new exporters, the importance of reducing 
red tape and transaction costs within North America is that much greater. 
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL TRADE-WEIGHTED42 TARIFFS (PER CENT)
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Source: WTO, “Tariff and Tariff Indicators,” 2011, “http://www.wto.org”www.wto.org.
The benefits of trade agreements diminish in relative terms over time as firms become more competitive. 
As discussed earlier, the growth benefits of NAFTA were largely absorbed in the first five years of 
the agreement’s existence. In order for firms to remain competitive, behind-the-border policies must 
be continually broadened and deepened through new trade agreements and other instruments. This 
has given rise to mega-regional negotiations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the U.S.-EU 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The disadvantage of deep integration within 
40 
Baldwin, “WTO 2.0.”
41 In negotiations with emerging markets, there remains a dual focus on tariff and non-tariff measures. 
42 Trade weighting puts more emphasis on products with relatively higher import levels, indicating products that are more 
likely to be moving through supply chains.
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regional trade agreements, as opposed to the inclusive WTO, is that it risks creating regulatory 
segmentation, exclusion and discrimination.43
The question for Canada then is, what are the risks and opportunities of investing in deeper NAFTA 
integration? As stated above, truly global value chains are rare, so the proximity and familiarity benefits 
of regional value chains make them the best option for all but the largest enterprises. 
Although it is possible to maintain footholds in a number of global markets, the fragmentary nature of 
regional trading blocks makes it very difficult for a medium-sized economy like Canada to be equally 
competitive everywhere in the world. Consider, for example, the regulatory differences between the 
United States and the European Union in their respective treatment of genetically modified organisms, 
vehicle safety standards or even the naming of cheese. For a medium-sized economy like Canada, to 
align with one large market is to disadvantage itself in another large market, at least until the two giants 
work out a common position between them.
A STRONGER CANADA-MEXICO RELATIONSHIP WITHIN A STRENGTHENED NAFTA
Canada’s relative competitiveness within NAFTA is not as strong as it could be. Canadian enterprises 
could control more aspects of sales and sourcing — more nodes of the supply chain — through 
investment and location in Mexico and the United States. Without these ownership benefits, Canada 
remains a spoke with low market power within the NAFTA relationship. 
Canada’s strength in Mexico’s mining, aerospace and financial-services sectors is indicative of Canada’s 
ability to expand further. Canadian entrepreneurs who have expanded to Mexico note that diversification 
has helped to counterbalance currency and demand fluctuations.44
Closer engagement with Mexico will also help Canada to strengthen its bargaining position with the 
United States; the two countries can form an effective counterbalance against the United States on 
matters of joint interest. Exploratory discussions on regulatory co-operation and border measures are 
a logical first step and, in October 2014, a Mexican observer was sent to the annual meeting of the 
Canada-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation Council. 
A strengthened relationship with Mexico will also help Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). With the growing presence of larger Canadian firms in Mexico, Canadian SMEs can expand 
their business to Mexico, docking onto established supply chains to mitigate risk.45 In an interesting 
variation of this strategy, Canadian high-tech companies are locating in southern California in order 
to reap the dual benefits of U.S. know-how and venture capital as well as lower-risk access to Mexican 
markets and skills.46 A foothold in Mexico also provides Canadian firms with business acumen to help in 
expanding into other parts of Latin America. 
Low levels of migration between Mexico and Canada are an impediment to the relationship. But while 
permanent migration from Mexico to Canada remains flat, Canada’s temporary foreign worker program 
has helped to facilitate the movement of Mexican workers to Canadian regions experiencing skills 
shortages (see Figure 2). In the other direction, Mexico’s friendly climate continues to be a draw for 
Canadians. More than 1.5 million Canadians visit Mexico annually for tourism and unofficial estimates 
43 
Baldwin, “WTO 2.0,” 12.
44 
Communications with Art deFehr, CEO of Palliser Furniture.
45 
Export Development Canada promotes protocol agreements to encourage foreign multinationals to include Canadian firms 
in global supply chains. Such agreements have helped Canadian firms enter Mexico.
46 
The San Diego-Tijuana mega-region is one area where this phenomenon is taking place.
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from the respective embassies suggest that there are about 100,000 continuing Mexican residents of 
Canadian origin and the same number of Canadian residents of Mexican origin. 
FIGURE 2 MIGRATION FROM MEXICO TO CANADA (FLOW)
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Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012.
MEXICO’S REFORM AGENDA
In 2013 Mexican President Peña Nieto launched a far-reaching reform agenda covering energy, 
telecommunications, finance, fiscal policy, education and labour. If successful, the reforms will increase 
economic opportunities for Mexicans and build the country’s stock of social capital. As a trading 
partner, Mexico will become more stable and prosperous and some of the reforms will provide new 
opportunities for Canadian entrepreneurs and investors as well.47 
Of particular interest to Canada are the energy reforms that will grant foreign companies exploration 
and extraction rights, effectively ending Mexico’s national energy monopoly. The state corporation 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) will become just one competitor among many. There are currently 80 to 
85 Canadian companies active in the Mexican oil and gas sector. If the reforms are successful, there may 
be considerable opening for foreign participation in upstream, midstream, and downstream activities. Of 
particular interest to Mexico are foreign investments in fracking and deep-water activities. 
Even though Mexico has agreed to the constitutional changes necessary to carry out the reforms, 
passage of secondary laws to establish a new contracting regime will not be easy and administrative 
details are beyond challenging. But in the end, a more open and vibrant energy sector should provide 
opportunities to Canadian companies, particularly service companies, although increased Mexican 
crude oil output could also compete with Canadian exports in the future. 
47 While many of these reforms have passed initial congressional hurdles, the bigger challenges of secondary legislation and 
reform implementation remain.
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Fiscal Reforms
Mexico’s fiscal reforms are intended to help alleviate poverty and income inequality by increasing 
tax revenues. At around 10 per cent of GDP, Mexico has one of the lowest tax-revenue levels in Latin 
America and the government depends on energy returns from Pemex for a third of its revenue.48 While 
Mexico’s reforms run the gamut of new revenue schemes, including a junk food levy, new taxes on 
mining profits are of major concern to Canadian investors. If successful, the new laws will impose a 7.5 
per cent mining royalty on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Other reforms 
that may affect Canadians are new value-added taxes in the maquiladora (contract manufacturing) 
sector and new taxes on stock market profits and dividends. 
Banking and Financial Services Reforms
Mexico’s January 2014 financial-services reforms seek to increase competition and lower the cost of 
borrowing by businesses and consumers. This is especially important for Mexico’s SMEs, which make 
up 35 per cent of the GDP and contribute seven out of 10 jobs to the formal economy.49 Overhauls to the 
banking legislation will make it easier for commercial banks such as Scotiabank Inverlat to offer more 
secure low-interest loans to a broader range of borrowers.
CONCLUSIONS
The clear option for Canada is to put its greatest focus on North America. We cannot be equally 
competitive everywhere and North America provides the greatest rewards for the least investment 
at the lowest risk. As a long-term strategy, Canada should continue to be involved in negotiations in 
Asia, Africa and elsewhere in the world to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise, but in the 
immediate term Canada must focus on NAFTA.
During the current lull in U.S. political attention and capacity, there is not much more that Canada 
can do to cultivate and promote bilateral trade with the United States until after the 2016 presidential 
election. Even with a Republican majority in Congress — traditionally the party more amenable to 
cross-border trade — the lame-duck session will offer few antidotes for bilateral ills. Meanwhile, 
2014 has seen a number of important reports setting out recommendations to improve the relationship, 
ranging from the establishment of a North American bank to study and prioritize regional infrastructure 
projects,50 to strengthening the U.S. appetite for economic co-operation by linking it to American 
security, energy, and resource interests. 51
There is, however, much that can be done with Mexico.
The natural linkages between Canada and Mexico were not strong during the formation of NAFTA. 
Changes to global production technologies, emerging market competition, and Mexico’s own efforts at 
stabilization and reform have reshuffled the deck. Canada and Mexico now share a number of important 
48 Council of the Americas website, “Explainer: Mexico’s 2013 Reforms” (December 17, 2013), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/
explainer-mexicos-2013-reforms.
49 Secretaría de Economía, “SME’s: The Growth of Small Giants in Mexico” (November 2011).
50 Eric Miller, John Dillon and Colin Robertson, Made in North America: A New Agenda to Sharpen Our Competitive Edge 
(Canadian Council of Chief Executives, November 2014).
51 
David Patraeus, Robert Zoellick and Shannon O’Neill, North America: Time For a New Focus (Council on Foreign 
Relations, October 2014).
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interests and opportunities, but they are so used to looking elsewhere that they are not paying enough 
attention to the NAFTA neighbourhood. (Granted, the sightline between Ottawa and Mexico City 
contains many obstructions.)
Mexico’s growth prospects, strong sectoral supply chains, and the shared trade governance regime 
created by 20 years of NAFTA integration make it the best option for Canada’s emerging-market 
expansion and investment plans. There is no other emerging market with which Canada is so closely 
aligned. This translates to relatively lower transaction costs and levels of market risk.
Mexico provides opportunities to create specialized, high-quality products than can be shipped to 
North American customers faster and more reliably than from Asian suppliers. Mexico also provides a 
hemispheric trading partner with strong growth prospects and access to markets around the world.
Both Canada and Mexico benefit from the fact that they have already aligned their commercial and trade 
policies with those of the United States. Thus, any benefits that the United States may secure in the TTIP 
and TPP should accrue to Canada and Mexico as well.
But there are obstacles to building a closer relationship. Canadian concerns about Mexican security, and 
Mexican frustration with Canadian visas are high on the list, but the lack of political will is the biggest 
impediment to overcoming those issues. The NAFTA institutions are weak and do not provide a viable 
space for continuing engagement. And many in Canada have made a habit of either underestimating 
Mexico’s prospects or holding onto the outdated idea that closer relations with Mexico would undermine 
the putative “special relationship” between Canada and the United States. 
From a strategic perspective, closer relations with Mexico will help the smaller parties in NAFTA to 
counter U.S. influence on matters of shared interest. Joint efforts to launch a WTO challenge against 
U.S. country-of-origin rules for meat products are a good example of how Canada and Mexico can work 
together to exert regional leverage.
Another important challenge for Canada is to move from a spoke to a hub in North American value 
chains, providing more control over innovation, production and distribution. Not only will this improve 
Canada’s access to high-value-added jobs, more ownership and control will also keep companies and key 
projects in Canada.
A regional value chain is not a zero-sum game. Thus, helping to build Mexico’s capacity to innovate 
through training and research partnerships is good for Canadian business. A prosperous and stable 
Mexico is a better customer for Canada. 
Within the Canada-Mexico sphere, businesses are talking to businesses about joint ventures, educators 
are talking to educators and student and faculty exchanges, but without political leadership and formal 
mechanisms for collaboration, those aspects of the relationship that the private sector cannot manage on 
its own will fail to thrive.
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